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Abstract: 
Throughout the COVID-19 outbreak, malicious 
attacks have become more pervasive and 
damaging than ever. Malicious intruders have 
been responsible for most cybercrimes committed 
recently and are the cause for a growing number 
of cyber threats, including identity and IP thefts, 
financial crimes, and cyber-attacks to critical 
infrastructures. Machine learning (ML) has 
proven itself as a prominent field of study over the 
past decade by solving many highly complex and 
sophisticated real-world problems. This paper 
proposes an ML-based classification technique to 
detect the growing number of malicious URLs, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which is 
currently considered a threat to IT users. We have 
used a large volume of Open Source data and pre-
processed it using our developed tool to generate 
feature vectors and we trained the ML model 
using the apprehensive malicious threat weight. 
Our ML model has been tested, with and without 
entropy to forecast the threatening factors of 
COVID-19 URLs.  The empirical evidence proves 
our methods to be a promising mechanism to 
mitigate COVID-19 related threats early in the 
attack lifecycle.  
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1. Introduction 
On the 31st of December 2019, unknown 
pneumonia was discovered in Wuhan, China. 
Since its detection, the outbreak of the novel 
coronavirus disease known as COVID-19 has 
spread throughout the world at an unprecedented 
rate, impacting the lives of almost every citizen 
across 213 countries and territories [1-2,13]. 
Whilst COVID-19 is gradually being controlled in 
many countries, it is still spreading throughout the 
world at a rapid pace.  As of August 2020, 
COVID-19 had infected over 25 million people 
and responsible for the death of over 850 thousand 
people worldwide. Figure 1 shows the countries 
case distribution [1].  
 
Fig. 1: Countries case distribution [1] 
Due to the coronavirus pandemic, governments 
worldwide have enforced strict containment 
measures such as lockdowns, border closures, 
quarantining of infected individuals and social 
distancing. As a result, a considerable proportion 
of the population employed within schools, 
universities, companies, and government agencies 
have transitioned to remotely working from home 
with no signs of that trend slowing. [4]. In a report 
published by Gartner, 74% of CFO’s interviewed 
intended to permanently move at least 5% of their 
workforce to work from home to save costs [5] 
after the pandemic. These changes, however, have 
ultimately increased the attack surface for cyber 
criminals [6].  
In the past, Cybercriminals have launched cyber-
attacks close to significant world events such as 
the coronavirus pandemic. [20] surveyed 319 
people post Hurricane Harvey to determine if 
cybercriminals use natural disasters as a basis to 
launch phishing campaigns [20]. Just over 36% of 
respondents received phishing emails during the 
disaster, and surprisingly 10% of respondents 
clicked on the links provided. Similarly, 
throughout the COVID19 health crisis, 
cybercriminals have become highly active by 
taking advantage of the massive increase in 
workload, education, and leisure-related online 
activity. Most of the malicious activity has 
included fraudulent emails and messages via 
social media, which contain malicious links or 
attachments. Malicious cyber actors are actively 
targeting individuals and organisations with 
COVID-19 related applications, making it 
difficult for individuals to detect malware [19]. 
For example, front line health staff at UW 
Medicine heavily utilised telehealth to assist 
patients remotely during the COVID-19 
pandemic. During this time, staff reported a 
dramatic increase in phishing emails (spear 
phishing) enticing them to download malware [6] 
via malicious links. In addition to hindering front 
line staff in an already crippled health system, the 
spread of malware or ransomware on health care 
systems can delay the diagnoses and treatment of 
COVID-19 patients. 
To tackle this growing concern, this paper 
proposes a model to detect COVID-19 URL’s 
shortly after domain name registration using 
machine learning based classification techniques. 
We have used recent malicious domain names 
detected during the COVID-19 pandemic and 
process the data for feature extraction using our 
developed tools. Our model leverages a minimal 
number of features which are available at the time 
of domain registration, such as the number of 
hyphens, the number of numeric characters, the 
Shannon’s entropy, the URL length and 
categorised based on the malicious threat 
weighting. Although entropy has been used in 
previous literature to improve detection 
performance, empirical data in this study suggest 
that entropy provides better performance in our 
experimental evaluation. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows; section 2 outlines current 
COVID-19 related literature and section 3 
describes our proposed model. Section 4 describes 
the data set and experimental setup. Section 5 
discusses the experimental results. Finally, 
section 6 provides the conclusion and future work 
followed by references.  
  
2. Literature review 
During this COVID19 time, the cybercriminals 
are taking advantage of sending fraudulent email 
and messages through social media that attempt to 
trick you into clicking on malicious links or 
opening attachments. The malicious cyber actors 
have been using the Coronavirus as a guise to lure 
and actively target individuals and Australian 
organizations with COVID-19 related malicious 
activities, making it difficult for the individual to 
detect or unknowingly install malware [26]. 
Alarmingly, since January 2020 more than 160 
thousand new malicious domain names have been 
created containing COVID-19 related keywords 
[27]. The malicious activities increase by 2000% 
due to COVID19 [28]. In response to this trend, 
the Australian governments recently issued 
notices educating users not to click COVID-19 
related links [29]. Whilst this approach may 
prevent some phishing attacks it does not stop 
unsuspecting users from clicking malicious links. 
Unfortunately, the number of phishing attacks 
have risen as more companies shift their 
workforce online [30]. This is alarming 
considering at least 36% of all data breaches 
reported in Australia before the COVID-19 crisis 
originated from phishing campaigns [31]. 
 
2.1 Emerging statistics of Malicious attack 
during COVID-19 outbreak 
In this section, we are illustrating the senarion of  
growing malicious attack patterns and attack 
types of malicious software during COVID-19 
pandemic.   
 
2.1.1. Sample of malware during covid-19 
During covid-19 the malware samples increses 
exponentially. The following Fig.1 illustrates the 
graphical representation of malware trends from 
April 2019 to April 2020 [33]. The figure 
demonstrates a simple comparison of malware 
samples from pre-covid-19 (April’19 – 
January’20) and during covid-19 (Feb’20 to 
April’20). It has been clear that there is a sharp 
jump in the number of samples posted from 
Feb’20 to end of March 2020 when the COVID-
19 spread all over the world.   
 
Figure 1: The trend of malware samples posted 
between April 2019 and April 2020 [33]. 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates the number of quick scan files 
submitted to falcon sandbox [34]. It has been 
sown that the number of samples gradually 
increases from February 2020  to end of May 
2020, which indicates that approximate ~3000 
samples increases within a couple of months 
during COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
Figure 2: Sample number of quick scan files 
submitted to Falcon Sandbox. [34] 
 
2.1.2 Trend of the attack statistics 
This subsection describes the statistics of various 
attacks in the relation to COVID-19 pandemic. 
For instance, in Figure 3, we can see the growing 
number of malware families and its types from 
falcon sandbox [34]. These are mainly the top 20 
families of malware attack statistics between ends 
of January to end of May 2020.  
 
Figure 3:  The top 20 virus families between 26 
Jan 2020 and 24 May 2020. [34] 
The distiribution of malicious file types has been 
illustrated in Fig. 4 which has been collected from 
Falcon Sandbox [34]. It is clear that the utmost 
part of the distribution is malicious URL and then 
peexe executable, which revealed that during the 
COVID-19 pandemic a huge number of malicious 
URL spread through the network traffic. 
 
Figure 4. File type distribution between 26 Jan 
2020 and 24 May 2020. [34] 
 
2.1.3. Phishiing Attack  
Phishing has become the most popular attack 
vector for cybercriminals and its impact of this 
attack is significant since it can involve the risk of 
identity theft and financial losses. The phishing 
scam and spam emails are growing enormously 
during COVID-19. The scammer is using the 
government and other potential domains to spread 
the scam or phishing attack to the user by using 
COVID related temptations [38]. The user is 
unknowingly using or following the URLs of 
instructions and loses their classified data and 
sometimes compromises the computers or user to 
make money. The Fig. 5 illustrates a sample of 
phishing scam which uses Australian government 
credentials using COVID-19 information [38].  
The distribution of COVID-19 related phishing 
campaigns has become so prevalent and 
problematic, that government agencies around the 
world have released public statements to prevent 
users from clicking on malicious links [18].   
 
Figure 5: Example email phishing scam 
pretending to be coming from the Australian 
Government [38] 
Despite best efforts to minimise phishing related 
attacks, cybercriminals constantly change their 
tactics to minimise detection and increase the 
success of phishing campaigns [25]. To be 
successful, phishing relies heavily on deceiving 
victims into downloading malware or disclosing 
personal information. To achieve this, phishers 
must jump through several hoops before infecting 
their victim. Even if a malicious email 
successfully progresses through spam blockers, 
the content of the text must then convince the 
recipient to follow the call to action. As a result, 
phishers increase clickthrough rate by invoking a 
sense of urgency, concern, or threat [8]. 
Cybercriminals also commonly use obfuscation to 
minimise suspicion by mimicking legitimate 
URL’s [4]. This tactic was observed during the 
pandemic, and alarmingly since January 2020, 
more than 160 thousand new malicious domain 
names were registered to contain COVID-19 
related keywords [2] for example, "covid19-
guidelines.com" [18].  
A crucial step in mitigating phishing attacks is to 
prevent people from clicking the malicious link in 
the first place. A number of methods have been 
proposed throughout literature to achieve this, 
such as user education, URL blacklists and 
machine learning.  
Minimising the impact of phishing via user 
education has been widely studied and is one of 
the preventative pillars heavily utilised by 
government departments. However, ultimately 
this approach does not prevent phishing from 
reaching the inbox of unsuspecting users. This is 
particularly problematic for younger IT users who 
have very low awareness of phishing or social 
engineering.   
Blacklists are widespread and offer protection 
against verified phishing sites. Initiatives such as 
PhishTank, Google Safe Browsing and 
OpenPhish maintain huge lists of malicious links, 
however offer little value in detecting new 
malicious links (otherwise known as zero-hour 
links)[8, 24] . For a malicious link to be included 
in a blacklist, it must first be discovered, shared 
and then validated. This creates a significant 
window of opportunity which can be exploited by 
cybercriminals.  
There is a significant lag between phishing attacks 
and the blacklisting of the corresponding site as 
illustrated in [17], where authors noted that a 
staggering 47% to 83% of phishing URL's were 
blacklisted after 12 hours and often drop off the 
blacklist only to return later. Despite their static 
properties, the popularity of Blacklists is a result 
of their ease of implementation and high 
accuracy. This is largely because they are 
essentially just a list of malicious links. However, 
cybercriminals can easily bypass blacklists by 
obfuscating characters in the path to avoid 
detection [14]. Overall, the task of managing an 
updated list of malicious links is an exhausting 
task and offers little value in preventing zero-hour 
phishing attacks. 
 
2.1.4  Taxonomy of attack patterns 
This subsection describes the categorizaotn of 
threat and attack patterns generated durign 
COVID-19 outbreak due to remote work and 
remote access. We have explored various data 
from Kaspersky from their collections [35-37]. As 
more users have switched to working from home 
arrangements, brute force attacks on Remote 
Desktop Protocol have increased substantially 
during the first four months of 2020 as shown in 
Fig. 7 [36].   
 
 
Figure 7: Number of brute force attacks against 
Remote Desktop Protocol systems reported by 
Kaspersky from Jan 2020 to Apr 2020 [36]. 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of web-based attacks reported 
by Kaspersky from Jan 2020 to Apr 2020 [36]. 
We can see from Fig. 7 that most of the growing 
attack in between March 2020 to mid-April. The 
attack vector has a sharp increase in early March 
2020 and most of the attacks in the region where 
COVID has impacted more during that time 
period.  There are also the increased demand for 
remote entertainment, web-based attacks. The 
Fig. 8 illustrates the web-based attack,  from 
January 2020 to April 2020 of remote 
entertainment and web contents, have increased 
by 25% in the first four months of 2020 [36]. 
Fig.  9 illustrates the DoS attack statistics reported 
by the first quarter of 2020 [37], which indicates 
that some of the DoS attacks are high during 
February 2020 when  COVID -19 is spreading 
around the world.    
 
Figure 9: DDoS attacks reported by Kaspersky 
during Q1 2020 [37]. 
 
Fig. 10 demonstrates the geographical attack 
distribution reported by the first quarter of 2020 
[37], which indicates that attack region is high in 
USA followed in Netherland,  Germany and 
France. It is obvious that those regions were 
impacted havily from COVID-19, during the first 
quarter of 2020. It is clear that the maliciour 
intruder targeted the countries during pandemic  
when  COVID -19 is spreading around the world.  
Kaspersky also demonstrated the attack pattern 
that around 40% attack origins from the USA 
which are most vulnerable in COVID-19 [37].  
 
Figure 10: Geographical attack distribution 
reported by Kaspersky during Q1 2020 [37]. 
 
2.2. Detecting malicious links with machine 
learning 
The use of machine learning to detect malicious 
links has been studied extensively throughout 
literature. The bulk of these studies focus on the  
detection of malicious links using  features such 
as the code of the corresponding page, the content 
of the website, the infrastructure details 
underpinning the UR or the string of characters 
within the URL (lexical features),. The detection 
of malicious links via the lexical features within 
the URL has been shown to be  fast and is low risk 
since it does not require navigation into the 
malicious link [15]. 
Studies such as [1-10] focus on the detection of 
malicious links using lexical features. [24], 
compared the performance of different machine 
learning algorithms using lexical features and 
distance calculations. Although the authors use 
only the subdomain, domain name and TLD to 
extract a small number of features, they attain an 
accuracy rate of 95% using SVM. By comparing 
the performance of different lexical features, they 
show a correlation between the domain name 
length, the number of hyphens and number of 
numeric characters within malicious links. Other 
studies such as [1] achieve impressive detection 
accuracies, however non-lexical features such as 
infrastructure information and page rank 
contribute to the final detection accuracy.[39] take 
a different approach and use natural language 
processing techniques to detect phishing URL’s. 
In their study, the authors extract brand name 
similarity, word randomness and over 40 natural 
language processing (NLP) features from a 
dataset of over 37000 phishing URL’s taken from 
PhishTank. Although the authors obtain an 
accuracy rating of 97% using RandomForrest, 
their approach requires a significant amount of 
pre-processing.   
Other studies such as [13][21] also use word 
entropy to detect malicious links. [13] use 
Shannon’s Entropy in parallel with other lexical 
features and achieve an impressive 99% accuracy. 
[21] separate URL’s into n-grams and prove the 
effectiveness of this approach using Shannon’s 
entropy. The authors make a positive contribution 
by proving that character distributions within 
phishing URL’s are skewed due to obfuscation 
techniques used by Phishers. Taking this finding 
into account, we also include Shannon’s entropy 
as a feature throughout our study.  
Overall, most studies on the detection of 
malicious links using the lexical features within a 
URL obtain their datasets from known blacklist 
sites such as PhishTank. This approach is accurate 
since most of these URL’s have been verified to 
be malicious, however, the bulk of these URL’s 
are harvested late in the attack lifecycle. For this 
reason, many studies improve the detection 
accuracy of their models using features not 
available at the time of domain name registration, 
such as special characters. To minimise the risk of 
malicious links, it is ideal to detect malicious 
domain names shortly after registration before 
they are circulated as malicious links. As [21] 
shown in their study, many phishing links 
obfuscate characters in domain names, indicating 
possible malicious intention at the time of domain 
name registration. Therefore, the aim of this 
research is to: 
The aim of this research is to: 
1. detect malicious links early in the attack 
lifecycle, shortly after domain name 
registration and before they are circulated as 
malicious links 
2. Combat malicious URL’s related to COVID-
19, and their associated security risks posed 
by COVID-19 online fraud campaigns. 
3. Identify effective measures to mitigate 
COVID-19 related threats, and safeguard the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
data held at the individual and organisational 
level.  
 
3. Proposed detection model 
To combat the influx of malicious URL’s related 
to the coronavirus, we propose a mode which 
detects malicious URL’s related to COVID-19. 
The detection of malicious URL’s via the lexical 
features present in the hostname is fast and low 
risk since navigation into the domain name is 
required. Most detection models throughout 
literature have been designed to detect URL’s 
from popular blacklisting sites such as PhishTank. 
However, most of the features utilised in these 
models are not available at the time of 
registration. For example, characters such as 
percent (%), curly brackets ({}), and the equal 
sign (=) are commonly used by cybercriminals to 
obfuscate phishing URL’s but cannot be used 
whilst registering a domain.  
Our proposed model can detect malicious 
COVID-19 URL’s shortly after registration which 
is early in the attack lifecycle. The following 
section describes our proposed model to classify 
malicious URLs. Fig. 11 illustrates the framework 
of our proposed detection model which is 
comprised of three main components: - 
 
 
3.1 Data pre-processing  
Comparison engine 
Our study focuses on the detection of COVID-19 
related URL’s. Therefore, the model searches for 
COVID-19 related URL’s registered for 
malicious intent. Initially, URL’s (both malicious 
and benign) are ingested into the comparison 
engine which searches for COVID-19 related 
keywords and obfuscated variants such as 
“C0vid”, “Cov1d” and “C0ronavirus”.  
Dataset processing 
After locating COVID-19 related domain names, 
all inbound URL’s must be standardized for 
feature selection. The scope of this study focuses 
on the detection of domain names registered for 
malicious intent. Therefore, malicious links 
containing characters which are not available at 
the time of domain name registration are stripped 
away. URL components present such as the 
protocols, ports, paths, and query parameters are 
removed, leaving only the domain name, top-level 
domain (TLD) and the second-level domain 
(SLD). 
URL Components removed during processing: 
1) Protocol – Application layer protocol used to 
access the internet services. For example, 
http, https, ftp, etc. 
2) Ports – The communication port used to 
access the service. For example, 80, 443, etc. 
3)  Path – The destination of the file on the 
target server. For example, path/file.php 
4)  Query – Request parameters forwarded to 
the target server. For example, userId=01.  
  
Malicious URLs
Pre-process 
Feature extraction 
and selection tool
Feature 
extraction 
Feature selection
Based on 
Malicious 
value
Similarity comparison
Classification 
Engine
Validate the 
classification 
results
Entropy calculation
 
Figure 11. Proposed detection model
URL Components retained and used for feature 
selection: 
a) Domain name – The registered 
identification string. For example, 
google, apple, amazon, etc. 
b) Top Level Domain (TLD) – Domains 
at the highest level of the domain name 
system (DNS). For example, .com, .edu, 
.net etc. 
c) Second Level Domain (SLD) – 
Domains directly below the TLD, for 
example .co, .au, .nz, etc. 
 
3.2 Feature selection 
  Lexical features 
 Lexical features were successfully used in 
[3][11][13][23][24][40][41] to detect malicious 
URL’s. The only characters permissible at the 
time of domain name registration include the 26 
letters of the alphabet (A-Z), numbers (0-9) and 
hyphens except at the start and end of the 
domain name string. Although, previous studies 
included special characters such as percent (%), 
curly brackets ({}) or hash (#) as part of their 
features, these are not available at the time of 
registration. Therefore, special characters have 
not been used throughout this study to detect 
malicious links. The analysis of the lexical 
features within a dataset comprised of malicious 
links illustrated in Fig. 12 where the x-axis 
presents the number of URL's and y-axis 
presents the feature set.  
 
 
Figure 12: Analysis of the lexical features 
within a dataset comprised of malicious links.  
On the other hand,  the Fig. 13 demonstrated the 
analysis of the lexical features within a dataset 
comprised of legitimate links, where the x-axis 
presents the number of URL's and the y-axis 
presents the feature set.  
 
Figure 13: Analysis of the lexical features 
within a dataset comprised of legitimate links.   
To fit with this criteria, we take a similar 
approach to [13][24][40] who successfully 
detected malicious links using the number of 
hyphens and numbers within the domain name 
string. The features selected to train our model 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
3.3 Feature extraction 
Our model uses a minimum number of features. 
In total, five features have been used throughout 
this study. These include the length of the 
domain name, the count of hyphens, the count 
of numerical characters, entropy calculation and 
the risk rating.    
a.) Length of domain name – The total 
number of characters in the domain 
name are included as a feature. All other 
components such as TLD and SLD are 
not factored into the length calculation.  
b.) Count of Hyphens – The total number 
of hyphens present within the domain 
name. For example, www.example-
website.com contains one hyphen 
character.  
c.) Count of numerical characters – The 
total number of numeric characters 
(from 0 – 9) present in the domain name. 
For example, examp1e-webs1te.com, 
contains 2 numeric characters.  
 
3.4 Entropy calculation 
In addition to the before mentioned lexical 
features, the Shannon’s entropy calculation of 
each domain name is calculated. Cyber 
criminals often use obfuscation to confuse and 
lure victims by mimicking legitimate URL’s or 
masking suspicious ones [4]. Therefore, the 
randomness factor of each URL was included in 
this study [13][21] showed that malicious URL’s 
have higher entropy calculations on average 
when compared to legitimate URL’s. Shannon’s 
entropy is calculated using the following 
equation: 
𝐻(𝑥) = −∑𝑝(𝑥𝑖) log𝑏 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=0
 
 
Where H(x) determines the Shannon entropy 
and x is the string being assessed. A higher value 
of H(x) indicates more randomness in string x. 
 
Malicious value  
The malicious value determines if a URL has 
been registered for malicious intent. The model 
takes known URL’s which are known to be both 
malicious and benign and delegates a risk rating 
based off the likelihood that the corresponding 
URL is malicious. Each URL is binary classed 
as follows: 
a.) Malicious - High probability the URL is 
used for malicious intent such as harvesting 
credentials or contains malicious code. The 
corresponding URL’s resemble known 
b.) malicious URL’s which have been 
previously flagged by blacklists.  
c.) Benign – Low probability that the URL is 
malicious. Does not resemble other known 
malicious URL’s.  
 
Table 1: List of lexical features used in this study 
Numbe
r 
Feature Description Previous studies using this 
feature 
1 Length Length of the domain name  [3][13][23][24][40]  
2 - Number of hyphens within the 
domain name 
[13][24][40]  
3 [0-9] Number of numeric characters 
within the domain name 
; [13][24][39] 
4 Entropy Shannon’s entropy calculation 
of the domain name 
[13][21] 
5 Malicious 
value 
Binary rating. 1 for malicious 
URL’s and 0 for benign 
URL’s.  
N/A 
4. Classification engine 
The classification engine is tested and trained 
with WEKA’s implementation of the 
following classification algorithms; Support 
Vector Machines, kNN, Naïve Bayes, Logistic 
regression and AdaBoostM1.  
 
4. Data collection and 
Experimental setup  
This section describes the collection of 
malicious data and our proposed experimental 
setup using ML techniques.   
 
4.1 Data Colelction 
To determine which domain names are a 
potential cyber threat, two classes of data were 
required: benign and malicious domains. 
Malicious domains were obtained from 
DomainTools and was comprised of newly 
registered domain names related to the 
coronavirus [2]. DomainTools provides threat 
intelligence of new and discovered domains and 
has been used in previous studies [42]All 
domain names in the dataset contain a 
corresponding risk rating ranging from 70 to 
100 which is a strong indicator of an existing or 
impending threat. To determine a malicious 
threat rating, DomainTools measure the 
proximity to known malicious sites using the 
domain name, registration information and the 
underlying infrastructure details.  
To gather a list of benign domain names, a 
publicly available list of recently registered 
domain names was extracted from WhoisDS 
from the 7th of April until the 25th of April 2020 
[9].The dataset was then filtered for coronavirus 
related keywords such as “Covid-19”, “cov-19”, 
“coronavirus” and “carronavirus”. During this 
time, a total of 27,841 domain names were 
registered across the internet containing 
coronavirus related keywords.  
After filtering, each domain name was data-
matched with the DomainTools dataset which 
contained 154,292 malicious domain names 
related to the coronavirus. Any domain name 
not available within both datasets was assumed 
to be benign. Post processing, only 1,573 new 
domain names were determined to be benign. A 
further 6,321 malicious domain names were 
added to the benign domains to create a 
balanced ratio 20:80. The following Table 2 
shows the experimental data set.  
 
Table 2: Experimental Data set.  
Dataset Number of URL’s used 
WhoisDS 1,573 legitimate domains 
related to COVID-19 
DomainTools 6,321 malicious domains 
related to COVID-19 
(randomly selected after 
matching with the WhoisDS 
dataset) 
 
4.2 Analysis of lexical features 
We performed an analysis of both the benign 
and malicious links in the dataset. The mean of 
the host length, number of hyphens, number of 
numeric characters and the entropy of malicious 
links were all higher than legitimate links, as 
shown in the Table 3. This validates previous 
studies such as [24] who observed a positive 
correlation between the host length and the 
number of numeric characters within malicious 
links. Entropy was also noted to be higher in 
[13][21] on average in malicious links. This was 
also observed with malicious links within this 
study. 
  
Table 3: Feature attributes.  
Feature Legitimate 
links 
Malicious 
links 
Host length 14.851 16.024 
Hyphens 0.19 0.2 
Numeric 
Characters 
0.455 0.647 
Entropy 3.262 3.342 
 
4.2 Feature extraction 
Python and Pandas were used to extract the 
selected features from the URL’s. The 
calculation of each URL’s Shannon’s entropy 
value is shown in algorithm 1. Each domain is 
split at the Top-Level Domain (TLD) using a dot 
(.). This exposes the domain name to extract the 
selected features. Using Python, we calculate 
the number of characters in the domain name, 
the number of hyphens and the number of 
numeric characters.  
Algorithm 1. 
 
def entropy(s): 
    p, lns = Counter(s), float(len(s)) 
    return -sum( count/lns * math.log(count/lns, 
2) for count in p.values()) 
 
4.3 Classification technique 
In our classification process, we input the 
generated feature vectors into the WEKA 
classification system for which we have written 
an interface. In all experiments, 10-fold cross 
validation is applied to ensure a thorough 
mixing of features.  In this procedure, we first 
select one group of malicious data from a 
particular data set and divide it into ten portions 
of equal size; then we select cleanware data of 
the same size as the group of malware data and 
also divide it into ten portions.  The portions are 
then tested against each other as demonstrated 
in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Classificaiton using n-fold technique   
 
To establish the training set, our detection 
engine takes nine portions from each of the 
malware and cleanware to set up the training set. 
The remaining portions from both malware and 
cleanware are used for the testing set. As is 
customary, the training set is used to establish 
the model and the testing set is used to validate 
it. The whole process is repeated so that every 
portion of both malware and cleanware is 
chosen as testing data; the results are then 
averaged. To ensure that the input vectors are 
trained and tested over a broad spectrum of 
classifiers, we chose the classifier/s from 
WEKA as they represent differing approaches to 
statistical analysis of data.  
 
5. Experimental results 
This section describes the classification results 
based on the dataset we have prepared after 
entropy calculation.  In our experiment we have 
used WEKA in our all experiment.  
 Table  4 to  Table 8  respresents the 
classification results  using various ML based 
classification  techniques.  Its has been shows 
that the  kNN , NB  ( Naïve Bayes) and Logistic 
regration   provide better performance without 
entropy , however SVM and Adaboost  has 
demonstrated no difference between  entropy 
calculation.   In our future work we are 
investigating it  with   modifying various 
paramentes and see why entropy calculation not 
impacting in classification results. 
 
Table 4: Classification results from SVM 
  TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
SVM (with entropy) 0.978 0.006 0.979 0.978 0.995 
SVM (without entropy) 0.978 0.006 0.979 0.978 0.995 
 
Table 5 : Classification results using kNN 
  TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
kNN (with entropy) 0.970 0.010 0.970 0.977 0.987 
kNN (without entropy) 0.992 0.002 0.992 0.992 0.999 
 
 Table 6 : Classification results using Naïve Bayes 
  TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
Naive Bayes (with entropy) 0.963 0.011 0.966 0.963 0.998 
Naive Bayes (without entropy) 0.966 0.010 0.968 0.966 0.998 
 
Table 7 : Classification results using Logistic Regression 
 TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
Logistic Regression (with entropy) 0.999 0 0.999 0.999 1.0 
Logistic Regression (without entropy) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Table 8 : Classification results using AdaBoostM1 
 TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
AdaBoostM1 (with entropy) 0.652 0.116 N/A 0.652 0.849 
AdaBoostM1 (without entropy) 0.652 0.116 N/A 0.652 0.849 
Comparison of the accuracy of classifiers:  
WEKA V3.8.4 was used to finalise our results 
which can be found in Table 6. The algorithms 
used were based off WEKA’s implementation 
of the classification models: Support Vector 
Machines, kNN, Naïve Bayes, Logistic 
regression and AdaBoostM1. WEKA’s default 
settings were maintained throughout the study. 
Each algorithm was run twice (with and without 
the entropy calculations) to measure the 
significance of the entropy calculations towards 
the final result. 
 
Table 9 : Comparrison of classification results 
  TP FP Precision Recall ROC 
SVM (with entropy) 0.978 0.006 0.979 0.978 0.995 
SVM (without entropy) 0.978 0.006 0.979 0.978 0.995 
kNN (with entropy) 0.970 0.010 0.970 0.977 0.987 
kNN (without entropy) 0.992 0.002 0.992 0.992 0.999 
Naive Bayes (with entropy) 0.963 0.011 0.966 0.963 0.998 
Naive Bayes (without entropy) 0.966 0.010 0.968 0.966 0.998 
Logistic Regression (with entropy) 0.999 0 0.999 0.999 1.0 
Logistic Regression (without entropy) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
AdaBoostM1 (with entropy) 0.652 0.116 N/A 0.652 0.849 
AdaBoostM1 (without entropy) 0.652 0.116 N/A 0.652 0.849 
Logistic regression produced unreliable results 
and hence were discarded. Using kNN without 
the entropy calculation in the dataset produced 
the highest accuracy (99.2%) and the lowest 
false positive rate (2%). The second highest 
result was produced when using SVM with and 
without the entropy calculation. Overall, the 
entropy calculation offered little value when 
detecting malicious links. When kNN was run 
with the entropy calculation the overall accuracy 
decreased to 97% and false positive rate (FPR) 
increased to 10%. No difference in accuracy or 
FPR was observed when using SVM.  
  
6. Conclusion and Future work 
 
In this paper, we proposed a framework to detect 
malicious domain names containing COVID 
related keywords. Using only 5 lexical features, 
our model detected malicious domain names  
with a 99.2% accuracy rate. To achieve this, we 
trained and tested our model using 7849 domain 
names from WhoisDS and DomainTools. 
Although the entropy of malicious domains was 
higher on average than benign domain names, 
entropy added little value to the overall accuracy 
rate. Infact, the best accuracy rate was achieved 
using kNN without the use of entropy.  
 
Overall, our model offers a promising solution 
to minimising COVID related phishing and 
malware attacks by detecting malicious domain 
names, early in the attack lifecycle. This is due 
to its ability to detect malicious URL’s with a 
high accuracy using only the domain name and 
a minimal number of features.  
 
Future work will investigate the incongruence of 
entropy as a feature. Unlike other studies which 
used entropy to improve their detection 
accuracy, we found that the inclusion of entropy 
offerered little value. This may be due to the 
changing tactics of cybercriminals who 
deliberately register domain names with a lower 
entropy to evade detection. Thus understanding 
this phenomena would offer a positive 
contribution to knowledge.  
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